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3 September 1947

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SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

Note by the Chairman

1. The enclosure represents a further study by the Subcommittee of the background facts of this subject, supplementing the presentation by the ad hoc committee in SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2. After a preliminary survey, it was deemed necessary to explore further the probabilities disclosed within the frame of reference before entering into the factual studies called for by the Subcommittee's mandate.

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is requested to note the indication in the enclosure that the Subcommittee intends to prepare special studies on these subjects:

- a. A clearer picture than is now offered in SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2 of action that may be required of the Subcommittee to implement policies, plans and studies for immediate employment of National Psychological Warfare in the probable brief period between foreknowledge of its immediate requirement and actual war;
- b. "Black" propaganda;
- c. To what extent personnel of the proposed Psychological Warfare Organization should be integrally a part of the military establishment.
- d. The management of information and propaganda to possible zones of combat in the Continental United States.

RALPH BLOCK  
Chairman

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ENCLOSUREState-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee Special Studies and EvaluationsPROBLEM

1. To determine the responsibilities and functions of a psychological warfare agency, taking into account the related functions and activities of other government agencies, with a view to recommending a suitable organization within the Government for the discharge of these functions in time of war.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

~~a. Certain of the duties of the existing Committee of three will be assumed by the National Security Council; and that there will be a continuing need for a coordinating agency composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and such other agencies of the National Military Establishment as may be deemed necessary.~~

~~b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue with duties substantially as at present and will continue their existing status as the principal professional military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.~~

~~c. Active military aggression by an enemy or enemies will be initiated against the United States without a Declaration of War.~~

~~d. More destructive aggressive psychological "warfare" than exists against the United States in the political field at the present time will be initiated both from without and within prior to the beginning of active military aggression by an enemy or enemies.~~

~~e. The time interval that may be available to mobilize for war may be of the order of a few hours or at the most a few months under the most favorable conditions.~~

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. A National Security Council has been established by the National Security Act of 1947 with the function to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the Armed Services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters involving national security. This Act specifies the composition of the National Security Council, namely, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of

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the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and such other officers as the President may designate according to the terms of the Act.

✓ ~~1~~ The Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) was established on 30 April 1947 as the agency of the State-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) under the terms of SWNCC 304/1 and 304/2 charged with the preparation of policies, plans and studies for immediate and continuous employment of national psychological warfare in time of war (or threat of war as determined by the President). On 5 June 1947 the SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) adopted the cover name of SWNCC Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations. This Subcommittee has been authorized, in the absence of a National Wartime Organization for Psychological Warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any emergency which might suddenly arise.

6. No other wartime organization of the Government has been established for psychological "warfare".

✓ ~~7~~ The following Government agencies are concerned during wartime, in activities related to psychological "warfare".

1. <sup>The Dept. of State</sup> ~~The Executive and the Executive agencies of the Government~~ have primary functions in the conduct of psychological "warfare" operations.

2. <sup>Wartime</sup> ~~The Department of State~~ and the National Military Establishment have primary interest and responsibilities in the direction and support of a psychological "warfare" agency of the Government, and contain resources which can be made available to that agency's use.

✓ ~~8~~ <sup>Departments of War and Navy</sup> ~~The War Department~~ on 10 January 1947 and the Navy Department on 10 June 1947 charged their services with responsibilities related to training, organization and equipping forces capable of employing psychological "warfare" methods, techniques and facilities.

9. ~~The Departments of the Army, Navy and the Air Force~~ <sup>and the CIG</sup> require

- a. Policy and strategic guidance;
- b. To be apprised of the character and extent of their contribution to the accomplishment of the national psychological "warfare" objectives;
- c. <sup>Allocations</sup> Resources of manpower and other operating resources commensurate with tasks assigned.

10. The Department of State, the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency have no funds appropriated for psychological "warfare" purposes. Rapid and

thorough demobilization since V-J Day has reduced psychological "warfare" manpower.

The only personnel now detailed to psychological warfare duties are listed below:

Navy Department	1 officer full time, 1 <del>officer</del>
Army Department	2 officers part time, <del>officers</del>
Air Force Department	1 " " " " <del>officer</del>
State Department	1 official part time, <del>officer</del>
Central Intelligence Agency	1 officer part time, 1 <del>officer</del>

11. It is the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the production of all ~~government~~ foreign intelligence and to produce national intelligence. Therefore, the Central Intelligence <sup>agency</sup> ~~group~~ is the only agency qualified to give co-ordinated intelligence support for ~~preliminary planning~~ ~~planning~~ and is so functionally organized at the present time. The Department of State, the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency at this time are not staffed adequately to cope with planning for wartime psychological "warfare".

10. As approved in SWNCC 30h/1 and 30h/2 plans and directives developed by the Subcommittee, which are to be implemented in actual or projected military areas, theaters or commands, will, following their approval by SWNCC, be transmitted, by rapid communication, to the military commanders concerned by the JCS, only, and the implementation of such plans and directives will be the responsibility solely of the commanders concerned.

11. In World War II the effectiveness of psychological "warfare" operations was adversely affected by:

- a. Lack of trained personnel.
- b. Lack of appreciation of the power, purposes, and uses of psychological "warfare".
- c. Procedural delays.
- d. Deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization.

Following the termination of combat operations psychological "warfare" personnel were demobilized and psychological "warfare" agencies were inactivated and liquidated with thoroughness and rapidity. As a consequence, no appreciable advantage was taken of lessons learned in World War II to <sup>prepare</sup> ~~revolve~~ personnel and methods into an integrated and coordinated organization for psychological "warfare" in time of war.

12. Information is being disseminated to the people of the United States by Government agencies as follows: Bureaus and Offices for Public Information of the Army, Navy and Air Force Departments, the Division of Public Affairs of the Department of State, and the Public Relations Agencies of the various Government departments.

13. The Office of International Information and Educational Exchange ~~in~~ in the Department of State is charged with the performance of informational activities "which consist of or are concerned with informing the people of other nations about any matter in which the United States has an interest". (Executive Order 9608, 31 August 1945.)

14. Consequent to Executive Order 9621 (2 September 1945) which terminated the Office of Strategic Services, *Effective 1 Oct 46* no psychological "warfare" activities and functions such as were performed by the Office of Strategic Services in World War II are the responsibility of any existing Government agency.

15. No psychological warfare specialist reserves, organized as such, exist within the National Military Establishment or the Department of State.

16. The effective conduct of psychological warfare requires:

- a. Furtherance of accomplishment of national objectives;
- b. Coordination with military, political and economic policy;
- c. Formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies; development and utilization of counter measures;
- d. *MEANS up to military and* Procurement and training of personnel, ~~organizing and administering,~~ procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment; gathering, analysis and evaluation of appropriate intelligence for the purpose of directing psychological warfare activities; preparation and distribution of psychological warfare material; constant evaluation of results; research in and development of new psychological warfare methods, techniques, equipment and instruments.

17. The report of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services (Senate Report 239 - 5 June 1947) stated in part:

"In looking to the future, it is apparent from the potentialities implicit in scientific developments, that the world is entering an era in which war, if it comes, will be fought at speeds and accompanied by devastations that stagger the imagination. Consequently, in order at once to guard our safety and support our efforts to promote and maintain the peace of the world, it is essential that this country move without delay to provide itself with the best organization for security which can be devised."

18. In estimating the situation with a view to recommending a suitable organization within the Government for the discharge of psychological "warfare" functions in time of war, it appears essential to appraise the related situation in world affairs within which such an organization, when made operational, might bring psychological

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 weapons into action. In the area of world affairs there are forces at work now in a great power struggle.

Psycho-political "warfare" comprises one of these interactions of forces. It is noted that active psycho-political "warfare", if not psychological "warfare", operations against United States policies and interests is now being conducted by foreign ~~activities under~~ the control of, dominated by, or in sympathy with powerful foreign groups. Such operations appear to be conducted systematically and <sup>in order to</sup> ~~along the lines of~~ carefully devised plans of military character. Current intelligence supports the view that extensive operations are being conducted against our interests. Overt operations <sup>both with and without a front</sup> ~~against the~~ United States interests are using the media of radio, <sup>and</sup> press, <sup>and the</sup> infiltration, <sup>and the</sup> ~~and utilizing bourgeois parliamentary mechanisms~~ for revolutionary agitation and propaganda.

#### DISCUSSION.

19. The National Security Act established the National Security Council as the primary advisory body to the Chief Executive on matters pertaining to national security, replacing the informal Committee of Three, comprising the Secretaries of State, War and Navy previously performing this function. National policy embraces integrated military-political-economic policy in support and in pursuit of national security. Psychological "warfare" requires direction and phasing in coordination with military-political-economic operations to the best accomplishment of national aims. Such overall direction and phasing appear to lie within the powers of the National Security Council. It appears essential that the National Security Council should relate such considerations to the direction of psychological "warfare".

20. The translation of national policy into overall strategic plans of military, political, economic, and psychological "warfare" operations requires complete coordination to avoid conflicting processes or objectives and to insure that the total resources are employed to a furtherance of the national objectives. The apportionment of resources and effort among these several operations is dependent upon strategic essentiality and evaluation of risks in the changing situation.

21. The President may within his powers issue instructions to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense which would without a public declaration of a state of emergency set in motion limited psychological "warfare" operations.

22. The SNNC Subcommittee is described in the Charter (SNNC 304/1 - 304/2) as "an agency of SNNC charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and

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 studies for employment in time of war, (or threat of war as determined by the President)

~~The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any war emergency which might suddenly arise.~~ This section of the Charter should be viewed in the light of section a. of the Problem (To recommend) "a peacetime organization for keeping psychological warfare in a ready-for-mobilization status."  
 Analysis of the elements in these predications of purpose indicates that:

a. The Subcommittee is responsible for plans and policies which presumably might need to be placed in rapid operation and implementation, without previous preparation or warning; requiring likewise, the immediate deployment of psychological warfare personnel.

b. Neither SSMOC nor the subcommittee have authority over any appropriated funds in the measure essential to carrying out these purposes.

c. Activation of psychological warfare subsequent to secret instructions by the President to the Department of State and the National Military Establishment would depend largely on provision from the Executive Emergency Funds.

d. A public declaration of emergency would conceivably be followed by a request for and Congressional appropriation of funds for essential purposes arising out of the emergency.

e. No organized body of personnel trained for psychological warfare exists in the Executive Departments nor is there any provision for adequate training of psychological warfare personnel. Such provision would require:

- (1) A training school.
- (2) Recruitment policies and measures.
- (3) A training period of anywhere from three months to a year.

f. The establishing of a Central Psychological Warfare Agency by Executive Order, as a part of the comprehensive program for future security of the United States as expressed in the National Security Act of 1947, would require immediate appropriation of funds for its activation.

*Further changed in the Charter:*  
 To fulfill the mandate of the Subcommittee's charter, "The Subcommittee shall have authority, in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare, to coordinate implementation of approved psychological warfare plans in any <sup>war</sup> emergency which might suddenly arise", it becomes necessary now to establish close coordination with respective staff sections of the National Military Establishment which are concerned with psychological warfare.

23. The formulation of psychological warfare plans and policies in accordance with national policy and in coordination with military, political and economic planning, requires the existence of a policy and planning body which to be effective must be under the authority and direction of a single responsible head who is <sup>to be</sup> ~~at the same time~~ responsible for the functional operations of the agency. It is considered that the individual so charged will report directly to the National Security Council, and to the President as its Chairman. This policy and planning body must include representation from the JCS and <sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff</sup> representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as individuals and representatives of their respective organizations.

24. Selection and designation of representatives to such a planning and policy board should be made in consideration of the appointee's related experience and knowledge and appreciation of the power, purposes, capabilities and applications of psychological warfare. Training should be <sup>accomplished</sup> ~~programmed~~ within the military <sup>estimates to</sup> broaden the general <sup>of personnel</sup> ~~operation~~ of psychological "warfare" to provide adequately trained personnel to satisfy planning and policy functions, and to provide reserves adequate <sup>for</sup> ~~as~~ operational needs consequent to activation or mobilization.

25. Performance of functions of sabotage, conspiracy and, as they relate to subversion, "Black" propaganda are nowhere now assured, in time of war, within the structure of the Government. In order to combine the "Black" and "White" processes so that they may cooperate to obtain overall psychological "warfare" objectives, coordination should be effected on the various levels of policy and implementation within the structure of the Central Psychological Warfare Organization. Special study will be required to ascertain how the foregoing may be assured and accomplished. Since the performance of the functions of sabotage and subversion, "Black" propaganda, and conspiracy are nowhere now assured in time of war, within the framework of Government, special study will be required to ascertain how these functions may be made available to the national Psychological Warfare Organization.

26. Experience of World War II (see Appendix) indicates that honest information on the progress of a war should be imparted in a regular manner to maintain public confidence. Such dissemination should not contain information which is deemed to be confusing to the public, should not contain statements believed not to be in accordance with the facts nor should it omit facts which need to be stated in order not to be misleading to the public. Notwithstanding these criteria, no information should be



27. In World War II, Government agencies became the principal sources of releasable information about the war. In collaboration with the Office of Censorship the press and the radio operated under rules of voluntary censorship. In the event of attack upon or occupation of any part of Continental United States, the dissemination of information by the Press and the radio should be subject to a sufficient control to coordinate such dissemination with the purposes and functions of psychological warfare. In such an eventuality the interests of national survival appear to transcend the importance of the traditional concept of freedom of the Press and freedom of information.

28. In the event the Continental United States or a part thereof becomes a zone of combat, such a situation will demand special management of information and propaganda different from that experienced in previous wars. Special studies will be required to resolve these considerations.

29. In the establishment of a psychological warfare organization, differences in status, privileges, promotions, pay and training between civilian and uniformed personnel poses problems of command, discipline, general morale, logistics and housekeeping. Complete militarization as a possible solution of these problems must be seen in the light of the characteristics of military organization, which might tend to limit essential freedom of action in certain instances. These problems are of such a nature that an effective satisfactory solution requires a special study by the Subcommittee.

CONCLUSIONS

D. It is concluded that:

3 ✓ a. The wartime Psychological Warfare Organization (hereinafter referred to as the Organization) be established under the National Security Council.

✓ b. Be directed by a Director who shall be the head of the Organization; the Director to be appointed by the President from among individuals in civilian life or from commissioned officers of the Armed Services; the Director to report directly to the National Security Council and to the President as Chairman.

✓ c. The Director to provide unified direction and authoritative coordination of the national effort, activities, and operations related to psychological warfare; using established agencies to perform such functions as may be <sup>appropriate</sup> ~~appropriate~~ to these objectives.

✓ d. The Director of the Organization to be the chairman of a policy and planning board which will include representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and representatives of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, who are qualified to participate both as individuals and as representatives of their respective organizations; and representatives from such other Government agencies whose participation may be found necessary or desirable.

✓ e. The Organization be provided with the necessary authority, strategic guidance, information, and resources of manpower, funds, facilities and materials to enable its proper functioning.

✓ f. <sup>The Organization will,</sup> Subject to plan approval by the National Security Council, in time of war plan, develop, control and coordinate all foreign and domestic psychological warfare activities, and will coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies.

g. The Organization will have access to or be provided with <sup>foreign</sup> such intelligence as relates to psychological warfare <sup>by the C.I.A. other sources</sup> and as may be essential to the accomplishment of the Organization's approved functions, missions and tasks.

## ✓ f. Training to be programmed within the National Military

## Establishment to:

- (1) Broaden the general appreciation of psychological "warfare" capabilities and as a weapon;
- (2) Provide adequately trained personnel to satisfy planning and policy functions;
- (3) Provide reserves adequate to operational needs consequent to activation or mobilization.

A psychological "warfare" category for qualified trainees be established to facilitate placement.

g. Establish rosters and files, ~~and~~ descriptive of personnel as related to loyalty, qualification and suitability for placement *to established made* should be maintained and available to the ~~ADP~~ Organisation, to include:

- (1) Trained civilian personnel on duty in the Department of State;
- (2) Personnel on duty in World War II in the Army, Navy, Air Force, GHI, OSS and other activities which directly participated in psychological warfare.
- (3) Personnel trained in such activities subsequent to 2 above.

RECOMMENDATIONS

## 31. It is recommended that:

- OK a. The Conclusions be approved for planning purposes. *And action indicated*
- b. The Army, Navy and Air Force Departments collaborate in programming training within the National Military Establishment to attain psychological "warfare" readiness and establish a psychological "warfare" specialist category.
- c. The Department of State to develop and maintain records of experienced psychological warfare civilian personnel to facilitate placement.